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Abstract:  The effect of decentralisation on regional economic growth is a hotly debated 
topic. In theory, decentralisation should entail welfare benefits by bringing government closer 
to the people. In practice, the benefits of decentralisation have been hard to prove. A problem 
is that the quality of regional governments is often lacking, or at least varies widely across 
different regions. Hence, regional governments may not be capable of delivering public goods 
in an efficient and accountable manner. Previous analyses have, however, neglected how the 
benefits of decentralisation may depend on the quality of the regional government whose 
authority is strengthened by such reforms. This paper considers these two dimensions in 
conjunction, highlighting that the effect of decentralisation on economic performance is 
highly mediated by the quality of the devolved government. Using panel data for 223 regions 
in the EU, the results show that the quality of regional government is a better predictor of 
economic development than decentralisation. Regional government quality also conditions the 
economic returns to decentralisation, meaning decentralisation works best in regions with a 
higher quality of government. Accordingly, decentralisation reforms must consider the quality 
of the regional government to which they would devolve authority.  
Keywords: political institutions, regions, quality of government, regional authority, economic 
growth, Europe.  
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1. Introduction 
Decentralisation of political power from national to regional governments is a global trend. 
From Asia to Latin America, from Africa to Europe, national governments have implemented 
reforms to devolve power to regions. From 1950 to 2007, 21 of 27 EU member states 
executed decentralisation reforms, increasing the number of countries with elected regional 
assemblies from 8 to 20 and adding 20 new levels of regional government (Schakel et al., 
2015). Pressures from regions for more political power, or even full independence, continued 
in the following years, from the 2014 referendum in Scotland to the illegal referendum in 
Catalonia in 2017. Regionalist parties are part of governing coalitions in Belgium and Italy, 
continuing to renegotiate the balance of power between the central government and the 
regions. Even in less conflictual settings, the trend towards decentralisation continues. For 
instance, the Norwegian government announced a regional reform in September 2018 which, 
according to its minister for local government, represents the largest devolution of power in 
Norway since the establishment of elected regional assemblies in 1975. 
An important motivation for these reforms is that, following the Tiebout (1956) principle, 
subnational governments can provide a better public policy delivery to match the 
heterogeneous needs and preferences of individuals living in different cities and regions 
within a country, thus fostering economic growth at the regional level by giving regions 
greater control over their own development. Indeed, regions often mobilise for 
decentralisation at least partly for economic reasons (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008; 
Fitjar, 2009). Theoretical works on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972; 1999) posit that there are 
welfare gains from decentralisation, as smaller electorates can agree on policies that are closer 
to their preferences. However, these must be balanced against the economies of scale arising 
from more aggregated units (Bolton & Roland, 1997; Alesina et al., 2000; Persson & 
Tabellini, 2005). Current approaches to regional development build on the idea of new 
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regionalism, which puts regions in charge of their own development (Keating, 1998). 
Consequently, regions need to possess sufficient authority to implement appropriate policies. 
European policy agendas, such as smart specialisation, also presuppose a regional government 
active in creating a shared vision for the region and implementing policies to realize that 
vision (Foray 2014; McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2014).  
However, there is still much debate about the effects of such reforms on economic growth 
(Treisman, 2002, 2007; Rodríguez- Pose & Gill, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2011; 
Hooghe et al., 2016; Kuhlmann & Wayenberg, 2016). Critics have argued that 
decentralisation rarely delivers the economic returns that its proponents had hoped for 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2005). A reason for this might be that regional governments are not 
always capable of providing public goods in an effective, accountable and non-corrupt 
manner. There is large variation across regional governments in the quality of government 
(Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2014) and, hence, in their ability to reflect public opinion 
and to carry out sound policies. This is arguably more important than its level of autonomy in 
shaping development outcomes (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015).  
It can be very different to decentralise power to a regional government that is functioning well 
and is capable of delivering good governance, than to decentralise power to a dysfunctional 
regional government. Yet, no previous studies have looked at whether the returns to 
decentralisation depend on the quality of the regional government which receives more power. 
Our contribution is that we do exactly that, analysing how the effects of decentralisation on 
regional economic development vary across regions with different quality of government. 
Accordingly, we seek to address this research question: to what extent are the economic 
returns of decentralisation affected by differences in government quality? 
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This paper has implications for theory and policy on regional development. First, at a 
theoretical level, it provides new knowledge on the conditions through which decentralisation 
may affect regional economic development. Second, at a policy level, specifically in the 
context of the EU, the findings can inform future decentralisation reforms, as regions are at 
the core of its principle of subsidiarity (Rodríguez- Pose, 1999, 2013; McCann & Ortega-
Argilés, 2014; Wanzenböck & Frenken, 2018), cohesion policy (Farole et al., 2011; 
Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015;  Crescenzi et al., 2016; Bachtler & Begg, 2017), and the 
EU2020 strategy (Dijkstra et al., 2013).  
Accordingly, we develop an empirical model using panel data that allows us to investigate 
how the degree of decentralisation and the quality of regional government affect regional 
economic development. We examine the level of regional authority along two dimensions: the 
region’s power to rule itself (self-rule) and its power to shape national policy (shared rule) 
(Hooghe et al., 2016: 19). For quality of government, we inspect the extent to which the 
regional government is perceived by its citizens to deliver public goods in an impartial, 
efficient and non-corrupt manner (Charron et al., 2014). We evaluate how these two 
dimensions, individually and jointly, affect growth in regional GDP per capita.   
The results show that quality of government is a better predictor of regional economic 
development than decentralisation. They also show that the economic returns to 
decentralisation are conditioned by differences in government quality. Thus, decentralization 
works best in regions with a better quality of government. These results provide implications 
for regional policy, suggesting that decentralisation reforms must take quality of government 
into account. 
The rest of the paper follows this structure: section 2 introduces the relevant literature on how 
decentralisation and quality of regional government may affect regional economic 
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development. Section 3 describes the empirical model and provides details on the variables 
and data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a summary discussion 
including policy implications. 
2. Decentralisation, quality of government and regional economic development 
Hooghe et al. (2016) propose a post-functionalist perspective on multi-level governance in 
which government is not only what it does (its function) but also what it means. They argue 
that communities wish “to retain their independence” but also “want the benefits of scale” 
(Hooghe et al., 2016: 18). We extend this, to look not only at what a government does (its 
function) but also how it does it (the procedures) or its quality. We adopt the definition that 
the quality of government is the extent to which a government delivers public goods in an 
impartial, efficient and non-corrupt manner (Charron et al., 2010: 2014). This approach is 
relevant as institutions have emerged as a central explanatory factor in understanding uneven 
regional economic development (Boschma & Martin, 2010). Institutions can be defined as the 
formal and informal rules of the game, that facilitate and constrain human interaction (North, 
1990; Nelson, 2002). Formal institutions are universal, transferable and codified rules. This 
includes political institutions, such as governments with the power to set and modify those 
rules (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Tomaney, 2014). The capacity of a regional government to 
shape formal institutions in a way that promotes regional development depends both on its 
formal authority within the political system (i.e. the level of decentralisation) and on its 
capacity for good governance (i.e. the quality of government).  
In the follow sections, we address the challenges of conceptualisation and operationalisation 
of decentralisation and quality of government (Treisman, 2002; Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 
2013a; Rothstein et al., 2013; Kuhlmann & Wayenberg, 2016). We elaborate on 
decentralisation and quality of government, specifically focusing on how both phenomena 
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affect regional economic development. We conclude with a summary and synthesis of both 
literatures to derive four hypotheses. 
2.1 Decentralisation 
The trend towards decentralisation of power from national to regional governments is driven 
by a combination of demands from the bottom and top-down transfers of authority 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; Manor, 2006; Fitjar, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2016). The idea of 
anchoring political power at the level of the region is associated with economic geography 
theories about regions as the natural units for economic competition in the global economy 
(Storper, 1997; Amin, 1999; Gertler, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2016). Associated with this, the 
ideology of new regionalism gives regions responsibility for their own development outcomes 
(Keating, 1998; MacLeod, 2001). Top-down regional policies for supporting lagging regions 
are replaced with bottom-up regional development strategies involving regional governments 
and coalitions of regional actors. To be sure, early accounts proclaiming “the end of the 
nation-state” (Ohmae, 1995) have so far proven hyperbolic, as national governments retain 
their dominant role in the world political system and continue to have the largest say over the 
rules and laws by which societies are governed. Nonetheless, the last 50 years have seen a sea 
change in the power of regional governments across the world (Hooghe et al., 2016). Ever 
more countries have a regional level of government exercising significant political authority. 
For instance, regional governments have been introduced across the formerly communist 
Central and Eastern European countries, which were mostly heavily centralised throughout 
the Cold War. In countries with long traditions of such governments, they have been given 
more power through a series of reforms. For instance, Spain and Belgium have been 
transformed from unitary states into quasi- or full-fledged federations, and the United 
Kingdom – long among the most centralised countries in Western Europe – has set up 
devolved regional governments. 
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This provides an institutional framework for the implementation of place-based policies to 
promote innovation and economic growth (Barca et al., 2012; Iammarino et al., 2018). Yet, 
while the political rationale of decentralisation has shifted to incorporate ambitions for 
economic and social change (Rodríguez- Pose & Gill, 2005), the ability of regional 
governments to deliver on these ambitions has not always lived up to expectations (Diaz-
Serrano & Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). 
Decentralisation can take various forms. Rodden (2004) notes that it can involve the transfer 
of fiscal, policy and political responsibilities. Ebinger and Richter (2016) and Kuhlmann and 
Wayenberg (2016) distinguish between political and administrative decentralisation, as well 
as deconcentration. Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose (2013a) highlight the power, management 
and resource dimensions. These forms of decentralisation do not contradict each other. Rather, 
they are complementary. Hooghe et al. (2016) add the dimension of federalism as an aspect of 
decentralisation, therefore including the notion of shared rule, or regions’ capacity to 
influence national policy-making, alongside their capacity to form and implement their own 
policies (self-rule). 
There is heated debate on whether decentralisation is beneficial or not in terms of economic 
outputs, as well as which forms of decentralisation may make a greater difference for 
economic outcomes (Treisman, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010, 2011; Hooghe et al., 
2016). On the one hand, decentralisation can improve the delivery of public goods and bring 
public officials closer to the people. This may facilitate matching and sorting as well as reduce 
information asymmetries (Tiebout, 1956; Treisman, 2002, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 
2003; Manor, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009; Kuhlmann & Wayenberg, 2016). It also 
facilitates the use of local knowledge to satisfy local tastes and enhances competition between 
regional authorities. The results are potentially less corrupt, more effective and accountable 
governments with increased participation of citizens, delivering better economic outcomes.  
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However, there is scepticism about whether decentralisation can actually deliver these 
perceived benefits. Treisman (2002) warns of duplicity, waste of resources, coordination 
problems and obstacles. He further cautions that close relationships between public officials 
and the local population might result in corrupt practices. Rodríguez- Pose and Storper (2006) 
and Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose (2013a) add the dangers of strong interest groups and 
pervasive rent seeking behaviour. Rodríguez- Pose and Gill (2005) warn of the introduction 
and reproduction of central state tendencies, depending on whether the source of legitimacy is 
coming from the top or the bottom. Instead of fostering sound competition between regional 
governments, this might result in a zero sum game or, in the worst cases, to pure waste 
competition.   
Empirical studies have focused more on fiscal decentralisation than other forms of self-
government (Rodden, 2004). As such, both policy decentralisation (Rodden, 2004) and 
political decentralisation (Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013a) have been given less attention 
and appear more difficult to measure. However, fiscal decentralisation fails to adequately 
capture the full phenomenon of decentralisation (Rodden, 2004; Schakel, 2008; Ezcurra & 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2013b; Hooghe et al., 2016). There is therefore a need for studies of 
decentralisation which consider more of its complexity and multidimensionality (Hooghe et 
al., 2016) and take into account the factors that may impinge on how decentralisation affects 
local economic outcomes. 
Most of the empirical studies that have delved into the complex relationship between 
decentralisation and economic growth have shown mixed and/or inconclusive results, both 
concerning whether decentralisation is beneficial or not, and which forms matter (Treisman, 
2002, 2007; Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013a; Kuhlmann & Wayenberg, 2016). The history 
and process of decentralisation can influence its economic outcomes (Rodriguez-Pose et al., 
2009). Furthermore, some regional authorities seem to be more effective than others (Putnam, 
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1993), and regional authorities may be effective in some areas of policy but not in others 
(Borghetto & Franchino, 2010).  
The proclaimed benefits of decentralisation in bringing government closer to the people and 
building on local knowledge pertain mainly to the dimension of self-rule. This involves 
handing over power to the regional government to sort out its own affairs. The idea of self-
rule follows from the principle of subsidiarity, in bringing political decision-making down to 
the level of government closest to those affected by those decisions. The shared rule 
dimension is conceptually different, being more related to the discussion over federal versus 
unitary forms of government. Shared rule involves regions participating in national policy-
making through e.g. parliament chambers representing regions rather than citizens directly. 
This is not related to the subsidiarity principle, but rather aims for a more equal representation 
of regions in national decision-making (i.e. one region one vote, rather than one citizen one 
vote).  
Decentralisation can also affect the quality of government (Treisman, 2002). Smaller local 
jurisdictions are associated with higher corruption and can be less effective at providing 
services. While Treisman (2002) is interested in the quality of government as the dependent 
variable, in this paper, we assess it as a mediating variable, More specifically, we ask how 
quality of government conditions the effects of decentralisation on regional development. 
Consequently, we now turn our attention to this phenomenon, discussing how the quality of 
regional governments might affect development outcomes. 
2.2 Quality of government 
Quality of government is the extent to which a government delivers public goods in an 
impartial, efficient and non-corrupt manner (Charron et al., 2010, 2014). According to Putnam 
(1993: 9), “the quality of government matters to the people’s lives: Scholarships are awarded, 
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roads paved, children inoculated – or (if government fails) they are not.” As such, 
“[g]overnments differ dramatically in quality, however one defines it” (Treisman, 2002: 1). 
Some governments are extremely corrupt, wasteful and ineffective, while others are honest, 
efficient and responsive (Treisman, 2002).  
A number of empirical studies have examined how quality of government differs between 
regions. The best known case possibly concerns the gap between Northern and Southern 
Italian regions (e.g. Putnam, 1993). Despite having the same formal authority, Italian regions 
differ widely in their capacity to produce favourable socio-economic outcomes. However, 
most studies covering this question have been limited to one country context, arguably 
characterised by extreme regional disparities. More recent studies (e.g. Charron et al., 2010; 
Charron et al., 2014) have generalised this discussion to a cross-national framework involving 
a large number of countries. Such research has used population surveys (Charron et al., 2014) 
and, in some cases, leveraged the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009), to develop a measure of quality of government for both the national and 
regional levels across European regions: the quality of government index (QoG). The QoG 
index adopts four of the six World Bank good governance indicators used by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2009) – control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, and 
voice and accountability – and created a composite index for every single European region. A 
number of ensuing empirical studies find a link between quality of government and a raft of 
regional economic outcomes, such as entrepreneurship, innovation or economic growth (e.g. 
Nistotskaya et al., 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo, 2015). Overall, regions with a higher quality of government tend to be more 
effective at implementing policies and programmes, resulting in better economic outcomes.  
Quality of government has various dimensions, each of which is expected to affect regional 
economic development. First, corruption takes away the incentives for innovation and 
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productive economic activities, leading economic agents to put their resources into rent-
seeking behaviour (Rodríguez- Pose & Storper, 2006; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Ezcurra & 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2013a; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Crescenzi et al., 2016). Second, the rule of 
law affects the investment propensity in a region (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015). It 
lowers transaction costs through ensuring enforcement of contracts and market exchanges 
(North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2005). Third, government effectiveness stimulates 
economic activities by the appropriate design and implementation of policies and 
programmes. Effective governments are capable of carrying out the policies that they set out 
to do (Charron et al., 2014). However, there is a limit to what regional government can do 
(Putnam, 1993; MacKinnon et al., 2009; Borghetto & Franchino, 2010; Tomaney et al., 2010). 
Fourth, voice and accountability are important to allow citizens to influence public policy and 
ensure politicians and civil servants do what they are supposed to (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013).  
Empirical studies have established a link between these components of quality of government 
and regional economic development. Del Monte and Papagni (2001) found a significant and 
direct negative effect of corruption on the growth rate. Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2015) 
found that corruption affects innovative performance. It takes away the incentives for 
innovation and economic activities (Rodríguez- Pose & Storper, 2006). Government 
effectiveness has also been found to have an effect on innovativeness (Rodríguez-Pose & Di 
Cataldo, 2015) and regional economic development (Ketterer & Rodríguez- Pose, 2018). In 
general, the components of quality of government are highly correlated with each other as 
well as with other socio-economic activities (Ascani et al., 2012; Charron et al., 2010, 2014; 
Rothstein & Holmberg, 2014).  
Some studies on quality of government have touched on the issue of decentralisation, such as 
Charron et al. (2010, 2014). However, they have only looked at the association between the 
two phenomena. There are no studies that have investigated how the quality of government 
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conditions decentralisation and its effect on regional economic development. In the following 
section, we discuss this relationship and develop hypotheses for the relationships between 
quality of government, decentralisation, and regional economic development. 
2.3 Putting the two together: Regional authority, quality of government and regional 
economic development  
Despite a few empirical studies looking at the association or correlation between 
decentralisation and quality of government (e.g. Treisman, 2002; Charron et al., 2010, 2014), 
there are no empirical studies that have investigated how the combination of these phenomena 
affects regional economic development. Institutional quality, and more specifically quality of 
government, have been consistent predictors of economic development (Rodrik et al. 2004). 
Empirical studies on Italian regions and recent studies involving a larger cross section of EU 
regions support this (Ascani et al., 2012; Charron et al., 2010, 2014; Rodríguez-Pose & Di 
Cataldo, 2015). Furthermore, regions that do well continue to do so and those that do badly 
likewise, reinforcing the core-periphery divide. These findings have also established a link 
between regional economic development and the four components of quality of government. 
On the other hand, studies on decentralisation and economic development remain 
inconclusive (Treisman, 2002; 2007; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011; Hooghe et al., 2016; 
Kuhlmann and Wayenberg, 2016). We propose the following hypotheses: 
H1: Regional government quality is positively associated with regional economic 
growth. 
H2: Regional government authority is positively associated with regional 
economic growth. 
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While decentralisation can have negative or positive economic implications, its effect is 
contingent on the governments involved (Rodríguez- Pose & Gill, 2005) and, notably, their 
quality (Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015). Our interest is to test how quality of government 
mediates the effects of decentralisation on regional economic development. While in the past, 
this could have been difficult to investigate due to the lack of data on these concepts, the 
availability of data across EU regions from the QoG index (Charron et al., 2010, 2014) and 
the regional authority index (Hooghe et al., 2016; Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010) now 
makes this possible. We propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: The association between regional government authority and regional 
economic growth depends on regional government quality.  
Finally, we explore how this relationship may differ across various dimensions of regional 
authority. Specifically, the region’s authority to govern itself (self-rule) is more closely related 
to theories of fiscal federalism and ideas of bringing government closer to the people than its 
authority to shape national policy. Furthermore, self-rule gives power to a regional 
administration and is hence more dependent on the quality of that administration, while shared 
rule is mainly exercised through the executive power of a national government. We thus 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H4: The association between regional self-rule and regional economic growth 
depends on regional government quality.   
3. Methods and research design 
3.1 The model 
This paper employs panel data covering the period 2002 to 2015 for 223 subnational regions 
across 21 EU countries. A region is defined as an administrative area at a subnational level 
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making an intermediate level of government between the nation-state and local government 
(Hooghe et al. 2016).  
The effect of political institutions on economic development is analysed through multivariate 
regression analyses using fixed-effect panel regression models. The empirical equation of the 
basic model adopts the following form: for region  = 1, , 223 in country ! = 1, , 21 at 
time" = 2002,  , 2015: 
#$%&'(!),* = + - ./46!6$" 789:7"9;$),*</ - .>?;%),*</ - @/46!6$" 789:7"9;$ A
?;%),*</ -BC),*</ - D* -BE),*        
#$%&'(!),* represents the annual GDP per capita in region r at time t. &6!6$" 789:7"9;$),* 
denotes the degree of decentralization, measured by the regional authority index (RAI) 
including its two dimensions: self-rule and shared rule. ?;%),*</ is the quality of government 
(Charron et al., 2010, 2014), including its four components: (i) Control for corruption, (ii) rule 
of law, (iii) government effectiveness (iv) voice and accountability.BC
),*</
 denotes a vector of 
control variables. D* captures time-specific fixed effects; and E),* denotes the error term.  
The data for the variables is merged from four datasets: 1) the European Quality of 
Government Institute (Charron et al., 2014); 2) the World Bank Governance Indicators 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009); 3) the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al., 2016); and 4) 
Eurostat data on regional economies (Eurostat, 2018). The variables are explained in more 
detail in the subsequent section. 
3.2 Variables and data 
The dependent variable, economic development, is measured using the level of GDP as a 
proxy for economic growth in fixed effects panel data analysis. The data for regional GDP are 
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collected from the Eurostat database (Eurostat 2018) for the years 2002 to 2015. The data are 
log transformed, due to skewness in the distribution of regional GDP.  
There are two main explanatory variables: decentralisation and quality of government. 
Decentralisation is measured using the regional authority index (RAI), which has two 
dimensions, self-rule and the shared rule (Hooghe et al., 2016; Hooghe et al., 2010). Self-rule 
is the authority exercised by the subnational government in its own territory with respect to 
five components: 1) policy scope, 2) autonomy, 3) executive control, 4) fiscal control, and 5) 
borrowing control. Shared rule is the authority that a subnational government co-exercises in 
the country as a whole with respect to five components: 1) law making, 2) executive control, 
3) fiscal control, 4) borrowing control, and 5) constitutional change. The RAI is the most 
comprehensive measure of decentralisation, based on a consolidation of the literature on 
decentralisation and federalism. It measures the degree of decentralisation as an aggregate or 
composite index of different forms of decentralisation. Using a composite measure has clear 
advantages over studying individual types of decentralisation (e.g. fiscal or policy 
decentralisation) or focusing on particular policy areas. For a detailed description of the 
individual measures, see Hooghe et al. (2016: 3-30). The data for these variables are taken 
from the RAI index (Hooghe et al., 2016). However, the RAI index data currently end in 
2010. As there have been no major changes in regional authority in Europe over the period 
from 2010 to 2015, we extend the 2010 data to 2015 in order to create a full panel from 2002 
to 2015. Some countries have several regional levels of government. In this case, we use the 
level with the highest RAI score. This gives a measure of the level of regional authority in 
each region, proxied by the powers of the most important regional government. 
The quality of government index measures regional citizens’ perception of how well their 
regional government performs its function, along four dimensions: (i) control of corruption; 
(ii) rule of law; (iii) government effectiveness;, and (iv) voice and accountability (Charron et 
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al., 2010, 2014). We use data from three consecutive surveys, conducted in 2010, 2013, and 
2017 (Charron et al., 2010, 2014; Charron & Lapuente, 2018).  
The quality of government index aggregates data at the NUTS1 level for all countries and at 
the NUTS2 level for some countries. The NUTS regions are somewhat arbitrary statistical 
units which do not always correspond to actual levels of government. Furthermore, there are 
cross-country differences in whether the regional level of government in a country is defined 
at the NUTS1, NUTS2 or NUTS3 level. In order to match the quality of government data to 
the regional authority index, which provides a measurement of the powers of actual regional 
governments, we use QoG data for the NUTS level closest to that of the strongest regional 
government. Hence, we resort to, for instance, the NUTS1 level for Germany, where the 
NUTS1 regions (Länder) are the main regional level of government. Meanwhile, we use the 
NUTS2 level for Spain, where the NUTS2 regions (comunidades autónomas) perform the 
same function. In some cases (e.g. Sweden), regional governments are at the NUTS3 level. In 
this case, we use QoG data for the lowest available level as a proxy for the quality of the 
regional governments within each region. 
The quality of the regional government is calculated using the method developed in Charron 
et al. (2010) and (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015). The calculation considers country 
characteristics based on the World Bank Governance indicators as follows:  
 !"#,$ = %"&$ + (')!*#,$ - ')!*.......$/  
 !"#,$ is the final QoG index for region r in country c. It is obtained as the distance from the 
regional QoG country mean (')!*.......$/ of the regional score (')!*#,$), added to WGI score for 
country c (%"&$) (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015: 681; Rothstein et al., 2015: 99). The 
four components of quality of government have been checked for validity and reliability. The 
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results show a high correlation between the components. Since we only have data for three 
waves, we use the World Bank Governance indicators to extrapolate from these, as done in 
Charron et al. (2010) and (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015), to create a full panel from 
2002 to 2015. The World Bank Governance indicators survey started in 1996 and was 
conducted every two years until 2002 and every year thereafter.  
We include control variables that are usually considered to affect economic growth at a 
regional level, including education (percentage of 25- to 60-year-olds with tertiary education), 
R&D expenditure, population density and employment in manufacturing. The data for the 
control variables are drawn from Eurostat (2018). Year dummies are included to control for 
time related effects. We do not include country dummies for two reasons: First, the 
calculation of the final QoG index for a region r in country c already includes a country 
dimension based on the WGI score for country c ( !" ). This is important for ensuring 
comparability across countries. Second, with few exceptions, the RAI also has little variation 
within countries. Ideally, we could control for the quality of the central government by 
including country dummies. However, even if one would argue that the quality of government 
at national level matters, “there are numerous empirical indications and anecdotal evidence 
pointing out that the provision and quality of public services controlled by a powerful central 
government can nonetheless vary largely across different regions (Charron, 2013, 72). Hence, 
country dummies would not necessarily be able to account for this. Table A1 in Appendix 
includes an overview of the variables included in the analysis. 
4. Regression results 
In order to test H1 and H2, we first estimate a model using regional authority and quality 
of government as independent variables, before assessing the potential interaction 
between them. Table 1 shows the results of this analysis.   
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Table 1: Fixed-effects panel regression results, main effects of RAI and QoG 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Regional authority 0.00138 0.00135 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Regional government quality 0.00702*** 0.00731*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Education, %  0.00167* 
  (0.001) 
R&D expenditure  0.00743* 
  (0.004) 
Population density  -0.00016*** 
  (0.000) 
Manufacturing employment, %  0.00643*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Observations 3,122 3,104 
R
2
 0.55812 0.56470 
Number of regions 223 223 
Time FE YES YES 
Region FE YES YES 
R
2
 within 0.55812 0.56470 
R
2
 between 0.39760 0.07731 
R
2
 overall 0.09419 0.01067 
F test 242.84174 195.41259 
P-value of F 0.00000 0.00000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The quality of the regional government has a positive and significant association with regional 
GDP, supporting H1. The authority of the regional government does not have a significant link 
to regional GDP. Hence, we do not find evidence to support H2. The results are consistent 
when controlling for education, R&D expenditure, population density and employment in 
manufacturing. The control variables are positive and significant, as expected, except for 
population density, which is negative and significant.  
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Table 2: Fixed-effects panel regression results, components of QoG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Regional authority 0.00215 0.00191 0.00164 0.00107 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control of 
corruption 
0.01347***    
(0.002)    
Rule of law  0.00642***   
  (0.002)   
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.00134  
   (0.001)  
Voice and 
accountability 
   0.00758*** 
    (0.002) 
Education, % 0.00180** 0.00178** 0.00191** 0.00194** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D expenditure 0.00874** 0.00778** 0.00769* 0.00728* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Population density -0.00016*** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manufacturing 
employment, % 
0.00659*** 0.00644*** 0.00624*** 0.00583*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 3,104 3,104 3,104 3,104 
R
2
 0.56793 0.56288 0.56133 0.56399 
Number of 
regions 
223 223 223 223 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 within 0.56793 0.56288 0.56133 0.56399 
R
2
 between 0.09255 0.08889 0.08724 0.09107 
R
2
 overall 0.01471 0.01383 0.01309 0.01462 
F test 197.99785 193.96570 192.75093 194.84616 
P-value of F 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2 decomposes the quality of government index into its individual components. Most 
components of government quality have a positive and significant connection with regional 
GDP. The only exception is government effectiveness which is insignificant. The regional 
authority index remains insignificant – as was the case in Table 1 – in all regressions. 
Table 3 does the same for the regional authority index, decomposing it into the dimensions of 
self-rule and shared rule. Neither of the two dimensions has a significant correlation with 
regional GDP, reinforcing the idea that, in general, political decentralisation is unrelated to 
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economic performance (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013a).  
 
Table 3: Fixed-effects panel regression results, components of RAI 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Regional authority 0.00138 0.00135   
 (0.002) (0.002)   
Self-rule   0.00253 0.00457 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Shared rule   -0.00166 -0.00614 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Regional government 
quality 
0.00702*** 0.00731*** 0.00708*** 0.00748*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education, %  0.00167*  0.00148 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
R&D expenditure  0.00743*  0.00766* 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Population density  -0.00016***  -0.00016*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Manufacturing 
employment, % 
 0.00643***  0.00644*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
     
Observations 3,122 3,104 3,122 3,104 
R
2
 0.55812 0.56470 0.55814 0.56485 
Number of regions 223 223 223 223 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 within 0.55812 0.56470 0.55814 0.56485 
R
2
 between 0.39760 0.07731 0.34572 0.10621 
R
2
 overall 0.09419 0.01067 0.07732 0.02121 
F test 242.84174 195.41259 227.60936 185.68406 
P-value of F 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from Tables 1 to 3 indicate that quality of government is a better predictor of 
regional economic growth than differences in decentralisation. They emphasise and reinforce 
previous findings on the relationships between these phenomena (Rodríguez-Pose & 
Garcilazo, 2015). These results further corroborate previous empirical studies looking at the 
association between quality of government and socio-economic outcomes (Charron et al., 
2010, 2014). Further, they stress the importance of each of the components of quality of 
government. Control of corruption, rule of law and accountability facilitate regional economic 
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development. These results are consistent with previous studies, such as Rodríguez-Pose & Di 
Cataldo (2015) or Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo (2015).  
Our main contribution, however, is related to H3, namely estimating the extent to which the 
quality of subnational tiers of government mediates the economic returns of decentralisation. 
This is assessed by including an interaction between regional government authority and 
quality in the regression model. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis. The results indicate 
that there is a positive and significant interaction between RAI and QoG. This provides 
support for H3: the potential influence of decentralisation on economic growth greatly 
depends on the quality of the regional government. Decentralisation is much more beneficial 
when regions have good government quality than in those cases where transfers of powers and 
resources are made to areas of the country where the government quality is more deficient. 
To test H4, we further include interactions between self-rule and QoG, and between shared 
rule and QoG. Table 4 also shows the results of these analyses. The interaction between self-
rule and QoG is positive and significant at the 10% level. The interaction between shared rule 
and QoG is positive and significant at the 5% level. However, the significance of the 
interaction between shared rule and QoG disappears when control variables are included.   
The results for hypotheses 3 and 4 highlight that decentralization works best in those areas 
with better quality of government. Furthermore, the results show that this is specifically the 
case for decentralisation in the form of enhanced self-rule.  
2
1
 
 T
a
b
le
 4
: 
F
ix
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
 p
a
n
el
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 r
es
u
lt
s,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 t
e
r
m
s 
 
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 p
ar
en
th
es
e
s 
*
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
1
, 
*
*
 p
<
0
.0
5
, 
*
 p
<
0
.1
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 a
u
th
o
ri
ty
 
0
.0
0
0
8
1
 
0
.0
0
0
9
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
) 
 
 
 
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 g
o
v
er
n
m
e
n
t 
q
u
al
it
y
 
-0
.0
0
1
3
7
 
0
.0
0
0
5
2
 
-0
.0
0
1
0
8
 
0
.0
0
0
3
9
 
0
.0
0
4
6
6
*
*
 
0
.0
0
5
5
0
*
*
*
 
 
(0
.0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
5
) 
(0
.0
0
4
) 
(0
.0
0
2
) 
(0
.0
0
2
) 
R
A
I*
Q
o
G
 
0
.0
0
0
6
3
*
*
 
0
.0
0
0
5
1
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
 
 
 
 
S
el
f-
ru
le
 
 
 
0
.0
0
1
2
5
 
0
.0
0
2
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
3
) 
(0
.0
0
3
) 
 
 
S
el
f-
ru
le
*
Q
o
G
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
7
8
*
 
0
.0
0
0
6
7
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
 
 
S
h
ar
ed
 r
u
le
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
2
8
 
-0
.0
0
1
2
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
6
) 
(0
.0
0
6
) 
S
h
ar
ed
 r
u
le
*
Q
o
G
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
8
2
*
*
 
0
.0
0
0
6
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
%
 
 
0
.0
0
1
6
3
*
 
 
0
.0
0
1
5
3
*
 
 
0
.0
0
1
7
0
*
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
1
) 
 
(0
.0
0
1
) 
 
(0
.0
0
1
) 
R
&
D
 e
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 
 
0
.0
0
6
9
0
*
 
 
0
.0
0
7
3
2
*
 
 
0
.0
0
6
9
7
*
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
4
) 
 
(0
.0
0
4
) 
 
(0
.0
0
4
) 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 d
en
si
ty
 
 
-0
.0
0
0
1
5
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.0
0
0
1
6
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.0
0
0
1
6
*
*
*
 
 
 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
 
(0
.0
0
0
) 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 e
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t,
 %
 
 
0
.0
0
6
3
7
*
*
*
 
 
0
.0
0
6
3
9
*
*
*
 
 
0
.0
0
6
4
0
*
*
*
 
 
(0
.0
0
1
) 
 
(0
.0
0
1
) 
 
(0
.0
0
1
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
3
,1
2
2
 
3
,1
0
4
 
3
,1
2
2
 
3
,1
0
4
 
3
,1
2
2
 
3
,1
0
4
 
R
2
 
0
.5
5
9
0
9
 
0
.5
6
5
3
4
 
0
.5
5
8
7
0
 
0
.5
6
5
1
7
 
0
.5
5
8
7
3
 
0
.5
6
5
0
5
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
re
g
io
n
s 
2
2
3
 
2
2
3
 
2
2
3
 
2
2
3
 
2
2
3
 
2
2
3
 
T
im
e 
F
E
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
R
eg
io
n
 F
E
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
R
2
 w
it
h
in
 
0
.5
5
9
0
9
 
0
.5
6
5
3
4
 
0
.5
5
8
7
0
 
0
.5
6
5
1
7
 
0
.5
5
8
7
3
 
0
.5
6
5
0
5
 
R
2
 b
et
w
ee
n
 
0
.2
4
7
8
6
 
0
.0
8
7
1
6
 
0
.3
0
3
6
1
 
0
.0
8
6
9
1
 
0
.2
4
9
7
6
 
0
.1
0
4
7
5
 
R
2
 o
v
er
al
l 
0
.0
7
7
7
2
 
0
.0
1
3
0
0
 
0
.0
7
5
2
5
 
0
.0
1
3
3
2
 
0
.0
7
0
0
6
 
0
.0
1
9
3
0
 
F
 t
es
t 
2
2
8
.4
7
9
8
3
 
1
8
6
.0
5
7
3
5
 
2
2
8
.1
1
8
5
9
 
1
8
5
.9
2
9
0
9
 
2
2
8
.1
5
1
8
7
 
1
8
5
.8
3
9
1
5
 
P
-v
al
u
e 
o
f 
F
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
 
0
.0
0
0
0
0
 
22 
 
To illustrate what these results mean in substantive terms, Figure 1 shows the marginal effects 
of regional government authority for regions with different quality of government, across the 
full range of the quality of government index. Figure 2 does the same for the self-rule 
dimension of regional authority. In both cases, the results show that the effect of regional 
authority on economic development is close to zero for regions with the lowest levels of 
regional government quality. Only when the quality of the regional government has an index 
score of 8 or above does regional authority start to have a significant effect (at the 10% level) 
on regional development.  
Figure 1: Marginal effects of regional government authority at varying levels of 
government quality 
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Figure 2: Marginal effects of regional self-rule at varying levels of government quality 
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined how the economic returns to decentralisation are affected by 
differences in government quality. Previous empirical studies of decentralisation have tended 
to consider this topic in isolation, assessing its viability regardless of the quality of the 
government which actually gets more power through decentralisation reforms. However, 
previous studies have shown that quality of government is important for economic 
development (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). It may also play an important role in 
conditioning the effects of decentralisation reforms. After all, one would rather want to give 
more power to good regional governments than to bad ones. In light of the dearth of empirical 
research on how differences in quality of government conditions the economic returns of 
decentralisation, this paper makes an important contribution to our understanding of how to 
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obtain the biggest economic returns from transferring powers and resources to subnational 
tiers of government. 
The analysis shows that quality of government is a far more important factor for economic 
growth than differences in decentralization. This is the case regardless of the dimension of 
quality of government considered, except for government effectiveness, or of the dimension 
of decentralization analysed (self-rule and shared-rule). The results also show that differences 
in quality of government condition the economic effectiveness of decentralization. This 
applies to the RAI as a whole and, specifically, to its self-rule component.  
These results have important policy implications. First, policy-makers and political actors 
need to understand that quality of government is a more consistent and better predictor for 
regional economic development than decentralisation. Therefore, mechanisms for improving 
government quality must be considered first, before other political solutions are sold. Second, 
the devolution of authority to regions with poor quality of government could result in 
unintended economic consequences (Treisman, 2002; Rodríguez- Pose & Gill, 2005; 
Rodríguez- Pose & Storper, 2006; Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013a). Despite its global 
appeal (Rodríguez- Pose & Gill, 2005; Ezcurra & Rodríguez-Pose, 2013b; Hooghe et al., 
2016; Kuhlmann & Wayenberg, 2016), decentralisation must not be seen as a panacea for 
economic development. Neither should it be regarded as a one-size-fits-all solution, but 
should be responsive to place-specific conditions. The quality of government differs from 
region to region (Treisman, 2002; Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Boschma & Martin, 2010; 
Charron et al., 2010, 2014; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Charron & Lapuente, 2018). Hence, 
proponents of decentralisation reforms need to take into account the quality of the regional 
government to which they propose to devolve authority when assessing the economic viability 
of such reforms.  
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This paper has only looked at decentralisation as an aggregate or composite measure, and has 
not considered its sub-components nor their types beyond self-rule and shared rule. As such, it 
does not consider how different public goods and services being devolved might be exposed 
to a different extent to lack of institutional quality in devolved authorities with low 
government quality. Decentralisation may place higher demands on regional governments in 
some areas than in others. Therefore, future research could consider the extent to which the 
economic returns of individual types or forms of decentralisation are mediated by quality of 
the regional government and its components. This could help shed further light on which 
reform solutions are likely to be more effective than others, as well as their performance 
dimensions, for example, effectiveness, efficiency and coordination (Kuhlmann & 
Wayenberg, 2016).  
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